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Abstract
We are the ﬁrst to introduce incomplete information to centralized many-
to-one matching markets such as those to entry-level labor markets or college
admissions. This is important because in real life markets (i) any agent is un-
certain about the other agents’ true preferences and (ii) most entry-level match-
ing is many-to-one (and not one-to-one). We show that for stable (matching)
mechanisms there is a strong and surprising link between Nash equilibria under
complete information and Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete informa-
tion. That is, given a common belief, a strategy proﬁle is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium under incomplete information in a stable mechanism if and only if,
for any true proﬁle in the support of the common belief, the submitted proﬁle is
a Nash equilibrium under complete information at the true proﬁle in the direct
preference revelation game induced by the stable mechanism. This result may
help to explain the success of stable mechanisms in these markets.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C78, D81, J44.
Keywords: Many-To-One Matching Market, Stability, Incomplete Information.
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1 Introduction
Both empirical and theoretical studies of two-sided matching markets have been use-
ful in applications. Many such markets have developed centralized market clearing
mechanisms (in response to various failures of the decentralized market) to match
the agents from the two sides: the institutions (ﬁrms, colleges, hospitals, schools,
etc.) and the individuals (workers, students, medical interns, children, etc.).1 The
National Resident Matching Program is the most well-studied example of this kind
of two-sided matching markets. Each year around 20,000 medical students look for
a four-years position in American hospital programs to undertake their medical in-
ternships.2 In many countries, each year thousands of students seek for positions in
colleges,3 six years old children have to be assigned to public schools,4 8th graders
high school students to high schools,5 as well as civil servants to similar jobs in public
positions scattered in diﬀerent cities across a country.
All of these entry-level matching markets share two speciﬁc features. The ﬁrst one
is the many-to-one nature of the problem: the workers enter the market by cohorts
(often once per year) and each worker has to be matched to at most one ﬁrm while
each ﬁrm might be matched to many workers. The second one is the centralized
way of reaching a solution: a centralized institution (clearinghouse) collects, for each
participant, a ranked list of potential partners and proposes, after processing the
proﬁle of submitted ranked lists, a ﬁnal matching between ﬁrms and workers.
1Roth and Sotomayor (1990) give a masterful overview of two-sided matching markets.
2See Roth (1984a), Roth and Peranson (1999), and Roth (2002) for a careful description and
analysis of this market. Roth (1991), Ehlers (2002), Kesten (2004), and U¨nver (2005) describe and
analyze the equivalent UK markets.
3Romero-Medina (1998) studies the case of Spain.
4Chen and So¨nmez (2006) and Ergin and So¨nmez (2006) study the case of public schools in
Boston. Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) studies the cases of public schools in Boston, Lee
County (Florida), Minneapolis, and Seattle.
5Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Roth (2005) studies the case of public high schools in New York
City.
3
Yet, and in order to survive, the proposed matching has to be stable (relative
to the true preference proﬁle) in the sense that all agents have to be matched to
acceptable partners and no unmatched pair of a ﬁrm and a worker prefer each other
rather than the proposed partners. Stability constitutes a minimal requirement that
a matching has to fulﬁll if the assignment is voluntary rather than compulsory. The
literature has considered stability of a matching to be its main characteristic in order
to survive.6 Indeed, many of the successful mechanisms are stable. This is puz-
zling because there exists no stable mechanism which makes truth-telling a dominant
strategy for all agents (Roth, 1982). Therefore, an agent’s (submitted) ranked lists
of potential partners are not necessarily his true ones and the implemented matching
may not be stable for the true proﬁle. As a consequence, the literature has studied
intensively Nash equilibria of direct preference revelation games induced by diﬀerent
stable mechanisms for a given true preference proﬁle.7 Not only that, there is also a
fair amount of agreement that these studies have provided us with a very good un-
derstanding of the strategic incentives that participants face in these markets under
complete information.
Nevertheless all this strategic analysis might be marred by the assumption that the
true proﬁle of preferences is both certain and common knowledge among all agents;
the very deﬁnition of Nash equilibrium under complete information requires it. In-
deed, participants in these markets perceive the outcome of the mechanism as being
uncertain because the submitted preferences of the other participants are unknown.
To model this uncertainty and to overcome the limitation of the complete informa-
tion set up, we follow the Bayesian approach by assuming that participants share a
common belief; namely, nature selects a preference proﬁle according to a commonly
known probability distribution on the set of proﬁles. Since matching markets require
to report ranked lists and not their speciﬁc utility representations, we stick to the
6See, for instance, Roth (1984a) and Niederle and Roth (2003).
7See Dubins and Freedman (1981), Roth (1982, 1984b, 1985a), Gale and Sotomayor (1985), Shin
and Suh (1996), So¨nmez (1997), Ma (1995, 2002), and Alcalde (1996).
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ordinal setting and assume that probability distributions are evaluated according to
the ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance criterion. Then, a strategy proﬁle is an ordinal
Bayesian Nash equilibrium if, for every von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function of
an agent’s preference ordering (his type), the submitted ranked list maximizes his ex-
pected utility in the direct preference revelation game induced by the common belief
and the mechanism.8
Investigating many-to-one matching markets under incomplete information is im-
portant for applications because in real life markets (i) any agent is uncertain about
the other agents’ true preferences and (ii) most entry-level matching is many-to-one
(and not one-to-one). More precisely, we study in many-to-one matching markets
direct preference revelation games under incomplete information induced by a stable
mechanism. Our main result shows that there is a strong and surprising link between
Nash equilibria under complete information and ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria un-
der incomplete information. More precisely, Theorem 1 states that, given a common
belief, a strategy proﬁle is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete
information in a stable mechanism if and only if for any proﬁle in the support of the
common belief, the submitted proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium under complete informa-
tion at the true proﬁle in the direct preference revelation game induced by the stable
mechanism.
Theorem 1 has many important consequences and applications. The most im-
portant consequence of this result is that it points out that, after all, the former
strategic analysis under complete information is meaningful, relevant, and essential
to undertake the corresponding analysis under incomplete information. Furthermore,
for determining whether a strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium under incomplete infor-
mation, we only need to check whether for each realization the submitted preference
8This notion was introduced by d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) who call it “ordinal Bayesian
incentive-compatibility”. Majumdar and Sen (2004) use it to relax strategy-proofness in the
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. Majumdar (2003), Ehlers and Masso´ (2004), and Pais (2005)
have already used this ordinal equilibrium notion in one-to-one matching markets.
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orderings are a Nash equilibrium under complete information. This also implies that
for any stable mechanism, the set of ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria is identical for
any two common beliefs with equal support. Therefore, any equilibrium is robust to
perturbations of the common belief which do not change the support of the common
belief and agents may have diﬀerent beliefs with equal support.
Another important consequence is that the set of ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria
for common beliefs with full support remain equilibria for any common belief. We
show that full support equilibria provide a foundation why any agent submits only
preference orderings which rank acceptable only partners which are acceptable ac-
cording to his true preference relation and the reported ranking over the acceptable
partners is truthful. This may help to explain why in markets using stable mech-
anisms most agents truthfully reveal their preferences over their partners reported
acceptable (Roth and Peranson, 1999). It also gives some insight into the success of
stable mechanisms since exactly these equilibria are robust to arbitrary changes of
the (non-)common belief. Furthermore, we apply our main result to obtain conclu-
sions about the stability of the outcomes realized under any ordinal Bayesian Nash
equilibrium and when truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium.9
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the many-to-one matching
market with responsive preferences. Section 3 introduces the incomplete information
framework to the many-to-one matching market and the notion of ordinal Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. Section 4 states our main result, Theorem 1, and its applications.
Section 5 concludes with some ﬁnal remarks and the Appendix contains the proof of
Theorem 1.
9We will describe these conclusions in detail later in the main text.
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2 Many-To-One Matching Markets
2.1 Agents, Quotas, and Preferences
The agents of a college admissions problem (or many-to-one matching market) consist
of two disjoint sets, the set of ﬁrms F and the set of workers W . A generic ﬁrm will
be denoted by f , a generic worker by w, and a generic agent by v ∈ V ≡ F ∪ W .
While workers can only work for at most one ﬁrm, ﬁrms may hire diﬀerent numbers of
workers. For each ﬁrm f , there is a maximum number qf ≥ 1 of workers that f may
hire, f ’s quota. Let q = (qf )f∈F be the vector of quotas. To emphasize the quotas
of a subset of ﬁrms S ⊆ F we sometimes write (qS, q−S) instead of q. Each worker
w has a strict preference ordering Pw over F ∪ {∅}, where ∅ means the prospect of
not being hired by any ﬁrm. Each ﬁrm f has a strict preference ordering Pf over
W ∪{∅}, where ∅ means the prospect of not hiring any worker. A proﬁle P = (Pv)v∈V
is a list of preference orderings. To emphasize the preference orderings of a subset
of agents S ⊆ V we often denote a proﬁle P by (PS, P−S). Let Pv be the set of all
preference orderings of agent v. Let P = ×v∈VPv be the set of all proﬁles and let P−v
denote the set ×v′∈V \{v}Pv′ . Since agent v might have to compare potentially the same
partner, we denote by Rv the weak preference ordering corresponding to Pv; namely,
for v′, v′′ ∈ V ∪{∅}, v′Rvv′′ means either v′ = v′′ or v′Pvv′′. Momentarily ﬁx a worker
w and his preference ordering Pw. Given v ∈ F ∪{∅}, let B(v, Pw) be the weak upper
contour set of Pw at v; i.e., B(v, Pw) = {v′ ∈ F∪{∅} | v′Rwv}. Let A(Pw) be the set of
acceptable ﬁrms for w according to Pw; i.e., A(Pw) = {f ∈ F | fPw∅}. Given a subset
S ⊆ F ∪ {∅}, let Pw|S denote the restriction of Pw to S. Similarly, given Pf ∈ Pf ,
v ∈ W ∪ {∅}, and S ⊆ W ∪ {∅}, we deﬁne B(v, Pf ), A(Pf ), and Pf |S. A college
admissions problem (or many-to-one matching market) is a quadruple (F,W, q, P ).
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2.2 Stable Matchings
The assignment problem consists of matching workers with ﬁrms keeping the bilateral
nature of their relationship, complying with ﬁrms’ capacities given by their quotas,
and allowing for the possibility that both workers and ﬁrms may remain unmatched.
Formally, given a college admissions problem (F,W, q, P ), a matching μ is a mapping
from the set V into the set of all subsets of V such that:
(m1) for all w ∈ W , either |μ (w)| = 1 and μ (w) ⊆ F or else μ (w) = ∅;
(m2) for all f ∈ F , μ (f) ⊆ W and |μ(f)| ≤ qf ; and
(m3) μ (w) = {f} if and only if w ∈ μ (f).
Abusing notation, we will often write μ(w) = f instead of μ(w) = {f}. If μ(w) = ∅
we say that w is unmatched at μ and if |μ(f)| < qf we say that f has qf − |μ(f)|
unﬁlled positions at μ; f is unmatched at μ when it has qf unﬁlled positions at μ.
Let M denote the set of all matchings. A college admissions problem (F,W, q, P )
in which qf = 1 for all f ∈ F is called a marriage market or a one-to-one matching
market.
Not all matchings are equally likely. Stability of a matching is considered to be its
main characteristic in order to survive. A matching is stable if no agent is matched to
an unacceptable partner (individual rationality) and no unmatched worker-ﬁrm pair
mutually prefers each other to (one of) their current assignments (pair-wise stability).
That is, given a college admissions problem (F,W, q, P ), a matching μ ∈M is stable
(at P ) if
(s1) for all w ∈ W , μ(w)Rw∅;
(s2) for all f ∈ F and all w ∈ μ(f), wPf∅; and
(s3) there is no pair (w, f) ∈ W×F such that w /∈ μ(f), fPwμ(w), and either wPfw′
for some w′ ∈ μ(f) or wPf∅ if |μ(f)| < qf .
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Notice that this deﬁnition declares a matching to be stable if it is not blocked (in
the sense of the core) by either individual agents or unmatched pairs. Gale and
Shapley (1962) established that all college admissions problems have a non-empty
set of stable matchings and Roth (1985b) showed that larger coalitions do not have
additional (weak) blocking power because the set of stable matchings coincides with
the core. We denote by C(F,W, q, P ) the non-empty core of the college admissions
problem (F,W, q, P ). Since sometimes everything but P remains ﬁxed we will often
write P instead of (F,W, q, P ); then, for instance, C(P ) denotes the set of stable
matchings at P (or the core of P ).
2.3 Matching Mechanisms
Whether or not a matching is stable depends on the preference orderings of agents, and
since they are private information, agents have to be asked about them. A mechanism
requires each agent v to report some preference ordering Pv and associates a matching
with any reported proﬁle P . Namely, a mechanism is a function ϕ : P →M mapping
each preference proﬁle P ∈ P to a matching ϕ [P ] ∈M. Then ϕ [P ] (v) is the match
of agent v at preference proﬁle P under mechanism ϕ. Note that, for all w ∈ W ,
ϕ[P ](w) ∈ F ∪ {∅} and, for all f ∈ F , ϕ[P ](f) ∈ 2W . A mechanism ϕ is stable if for
all P ∈ P , ϕ [P ] ∈ C (P ).
2.4 Responsive Extensions
The notion of a mechanism in which ﬁrms (like workers) only submit rankings on in-
dividual agents ﬁts with most of the mechanisms used in real life centralized matching
markets. But a mechanism matches each ﬁrm f to a set of workers, taking into ac-
count only f ’s preference ordering Pf over individual workers. Thus, to study ﬁrms’
incentives in direct preference revelation games induced by a mechanism, preference
orderings of ﬁrms over individual workers have to be extended to preference order-
ings over subsets of workers. But a ﬁrm f may have diﬀerent rankings over subsets
9
of workers respecting its quota qf and the ranking Pf over individual workers. For
instance, let W = {w1, w2, w3, w4} be the set of workers and let Pf be such that
Pf : w1w2w3w4∅10 and qf = 2. While it is reasonable to assume that, under the ab-
sence of very strong complementarities among workers, the set {w1, w2} is preferred
by f to the set {w3, w4} or to the set {w1, w3}, ﬁrm f ’s preference between the sets
{w1, w4} and {w2, w3} is ambiguous since Pf does not convey this information. Fol-
lowing the literature,11 we will only require these extensions to be responsive in the
sense that replacing a worker in a set (or an unﬁlled position) by a better worker
(or an acceptable worker) makes a set more preferred; for example, in all extensions
{w1, w2} is preferred to {w1}, to {w3, w4} and to {w1, w3} but for some extensions
{w1, w4} is preferred to {w2, w3} while for other extensions {w2, w3} is preferred to
{w1, w4}.
Deﬁnition 1 (Responsive Extensions) The preference extension P ∗f over 2
W is
responsive to the preference ordering Pf over W ∪ {f} if for all S ∈ 2W , all w ∈ S,
and all w′ /∈ S:
(r1) S ∪ {w′}P ∗f S if and only if |S| < qf and w′Pf∅.
(r2) S ∪ {w′}P ∗f S\{w} if and only if w′Pfw.
Given a responsive extension P ∗f of Pf , let R
∗
f denote its corresponding weak
preference ordering on 2W . Moreover, given S ∈ 2W , let B(S, P ∗f ) be the weak upper
contour set of P ∗f at S; i.e., B(S, P
∗
f ) = {S ′ ∈ 2W | S ′R∗fS}. Given Pf ∈ Pf , we
denote by resp(Pf ) the set of responsive extensions of Pf .
2.5 Properties of the Core
The core of a college admissions problem has a special structure. The following well-
known properties will be useful in the sequel:12
10We will use the convention that Pf : w1w2w3w4∅ means w1Pfw2Pfw3Pfw4Pf∅.
11See for instance, Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
12See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for a detailed presentation of these properties.
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(P1) For each proﬁle P ∈ P, C(P ) contains two stable matchings, the ﬁrms-optimal
stable matching μF and the workers-optimal stable matching μW , with the property
that for all μ ∈ C(P ), μW (w)Rwμ(w)RwμF (w) for all w ∈ W , and for all f ∈ F ,
μF (f)R
∗
fμ(f)R
∗
fμW (f) for all P
∗
f ∈ resp(Pf ). The deferred-acceptance algorithms
(DA-algorithms), introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) and denoted by DAF :
P →M and DAW : P →M, are two stable mechanisms that select, for each proﬁle
P , μF and μW , respectively; i.e., for all P ∈ P , DAF [P ] = μF and DAW [P ] = μW .13
(P2) For each proﬁle P ∈ P and any responsive extensions P ∗F = (P ∗f )f∈F of PF =
(Pf )f∈F , C(P ) coincides with the set of group stable matchings at (PW , P ∗F ), where
group stability corresponds to the usual cooperative game theoretical notion of weak
blocking14. This is important because it means that the set of group stable matchings
(relative to P ) is invariant with respect to any speciﬁc responsive extensions of PF .
(P3) For each P ∈ P , the set of unmatched agents is the same for all stable matchings
and if a ﬁrm does not ﬁll all its positions at some stable matching, then this ﬁrm is
matched to the same set of workers at all stable matchings; namely, for all μ, μ′ ∈
C(P ), and for all w ∈ W and all f ∈ F , (i) μ(w) = ∅ if and only if μ′(w) = ∅, (ii)
|μ(f)| = |μ′(f)|, and (iii) if |μ(f)| < qf , then μ(f) = μ′(f).
3 Incomplete Information
Clearly any mechanism and any true proﬁle deﬁne a direct (ordinal) preference reve-
lation game under complete information.
Deﬁnition 2 (Nash Equilibrium) A proﬁle P ′ is a Nash equilibrium (NE) un-
13Strictly speaking, the DA-algorithm is an algorithm that ﬁnds the matching chosen by the “DA-
mechanism”. However, most of the matching literature uses the term DA-algorithm when referring
to both the algorithm and the mechanism. We follow this convention.
14A matching μ is weakly blocked by coalition S ⊆ V under (PW , P ∗F ) if there exists a matching
μ′ such that (b1) for all v ∈ S, μ′(v) ⊆ S, (b2) for all w ∈ W ∩ S, μ′(w)Rwμ(w), and (b3) for all
f ∈ F ∩ S, μ′(f)R∗fμ(f), with strict preference holding for at least one v ∈ S.
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der complete information P in the direct preference revelation game induced by the
mechanism ϕ if for all w ∈ W , ϕ[P ′](w)Rwϕ[Pˆw, P ′−w](w) for all Pˆw ∈ Pw, and for all
f ∈ F and all P ∗f ∈ resp(Pf ), ϕ[P ′](f)R∗fϕ[Pˆf , P ′−f ](f) for all Pˆf ∈ Pf .
A large literature on matching studies Nash equilibrium and its reﬁnements un-
der complete information in direct preference revelation games induced by stable
mechanisms; in particular, for the mechanisms DAF and DAW . However, for many
applications the assumption that the true proﬁle is common knowledge is extremely
unrealistic. We depart from it and consider the Bayesian direct preference revelation
games induced by a mechanism and a belief about the true proﬁle, which is shared
among all agents. A common belief is a probability distribution P˜ over P . Given a
proﬁle P and the common belief P˜ , Pr{P˜ = P} is the probability that P˜ assigns to
the event that the true proﬁle is P . Given v ∈ V , let P˜v denote the marginal dis-
tribution of P˜ over Pv. Observe that, following the Bayesian approach, the common
belief P˜ describes agents’ uncertainty about the true proﬁle before agents learn their
types. Now, given a common belief P˜ and a preference ordering Pv (agent v’s type),
let P˜−v|Pv denote the probability distribution which P˜ induces over P−v conditional
on Pv. It describes agent v’s uncertainty about the preferences of the other agents,
given that his preference ordering is Pv. This formulation does not require symmetry
nor independence of beliefs; conditional beliefs might be very correlated if agents use
similar sources to form them (i.e., rankings, grades, recommendation letters, etc.).
An agent with incomplete information about the others’ preference orderings
(more importantly, about their submitted lists) will perceive the outcome of a mecha-
nism as being uncertain. A random matching μ˜ is a probability distribution over the
set of matchings M. Given a matching μ and the random matching μ˜, Pr{μ˜ = μ}
is the probability that μ˜ assigns to matching μ. But the uncertainty important for
agent v is not over matchings but over v’s set of potential partners. Let μ˜(w) denote
the probability distribution which μ˜ induces over worker w’s set of potential partners
F ∪ {∅} and let μ˜(f) denote the probability distribution which μ˜ induces over ﬁrm
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f ’s set of potential partners 2W . Namely, for w ∈ W and all v ∈ F ∪ {∅},
Pr{μ˜(w) = v} =
∑
μ∈M:μ(w)=v
Pr{μ˜ = μ}
and for f ∈ F and all S ∈ 2W ,
Pr{μ˜(f) = S} =
∑
μ∈M:μ(f)=S
Pr{μ˜ = μ}.
A mechanism ϕ and a common belief P˜ deﬁne a direct (ordinal) preference rev-
elation game under incomplete information as follows. Before submitting a list to
the mechanism, agents learn their types. Thus, a strategy of agent v is a function
sv : Pv → Pv specifying for each type of agent v, Pv, a list that v submits to the mech-
anism, sv(Pv). A strategy proﬁle is a list s = (sv)v∈V of strategies specifying for each
true proﬁle P a submitted proﬁle s(P ). Given a mechanism ϕ : P →M and a com-
mon belief P˜ over P , a strategy proﬁle s : P → P induces a random matching ϕ[s(P˜ )]
in the following way: for all μ ∈ M, Pr{P˜ = P | ϕ[s (P )] = μ} is the probability
of matching μ. However, the relevant random matching for agent v, given his type
Pv and a strategy proﬁle s, is ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] (where s−v(P˜−v|Pv) is the prob-
ability distribution over P−v which s−v and P˜ induce conditional on Pv). But again,
the relevant uncertainty that agent v faces is given by ϕ[sv (Pv) , s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] (v), the
probability distribution which the random matching ϕ[sv (Pv) , s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] induces
over v’s set of potential partners.
Deﬁnition 3 (First-Order Stochastic Dominance) (fo1) A random matching μ˜
ﬁrst-order stochastically Pw−dominates a random matching μ˜′, denoted by μ˜ (w)Pw
μ˜′ (w), if for all v ∈ F ∪ {∅} ,
∑
v′∈F∪{∅}:v′Rwv
Pr{μ˜ (w) = v′} ≥
∑
v′∈F∪{∅}:v′Rwv
Pr{μ˜′ (w) = v′}.
(fo2)15 A random matching μ˜ ﬁrst-order stochastically Pf−dominates a random match-
15Observe that this deﬁnition requires that μ˜ ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates μ˜′ according to
13
ing μ˜′, denoted by μ˜ (f)Pf μ˜
′ (f), if for all P ∗f ∈ resp(Pf ) and all S ∈ 2W ,
∑
S′∈2W :S′R∗fS
Pr{μ˜ (f) = S ′} ≥
∑
S′∈2W :S′R∗fS
Pr{μ˜′ (f) = S ′}.
All mechanisms used in centralized matching markets are ordinal. In other words
the only information available for a clearinghouse are the agents’ ordinal preferences
over potential partners. In such an environment a strategy proﬁle is an ordinal
Bayesian Nash equilibrium whenever, for any agent’s true ordinal preference, sub-
mitting the ranked list speciﬁed by his strategy maximizes his expected utility for
every von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM)-utility representation of his true preference.
This requires that an agent’s strategy only depends on the ordinal ranking induced
by his vNM-utility function (if any). Moreover, ordinal strategies are meaningful if an
agent only observes his ordinal ranking and may have (still) little information about
his utilities of his potential partners.
Deﬁnition 4 (Ordinal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium) Let P˜ be a common belief.
Then a strategy proﬁle s is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium (OBNE ) in the
mechanism ϕ under incomplete information P˜ if and only if for all v ∈ V and all
Pv ∈ Pv such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0,
ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)Pv ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) for all P ′v ∈ Pv.16 (1)
Observe that, given a common belief P˜ , the set of OBNE in a stable mechanism is
non-empty. For instance, the strategy proﬁle in which all agents declare that no agent
in the other side of the market is acceptable is an OBNE under any common belief
all responsive extensions of Pf . Note that this requirement is meaningful since the clearinghouse
observes ﬁrms’ rankings over individual workers only and not which responsive extension they use
to compare sets of workers.
16In the deﬁnition of OBNE optimal behavior of agent v is only required for the preferences of v
which arise with positive probability under P˜ . If Pv ∈ Pv is such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} = 0, then the
conditional belief P˜−v|Pv cannot be derived from P˜ . However, we could complete the belief of v in
the following way: let P˜−v|Pv put probability one on a proﬁle where all other agents submit lists
which do not contain v.
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since a stable mechanism selects, at all proﬁles P and (P−v, P ′v), the empty matching.
Furthermore, any matching μ can be connected to an OBNE sμ in a stable mechanism
in the following way: for any v ∈ V and any Pv ∈ Pv, let A(sμv (Pv)) = μ(v) ∩ A(Pv).
Then sμ is an OBNE in a stable mechanism under any common belief because for
any true preference relation, agent v reports acceptable exactly the partner(s) which
are both speciﬁed by μ and are acceptable under his true preference relation. If
information is complete, then any sμ is a Nash equilibrium in ϕ and the outcomes of
the strategies sμ is the set of all individually rational matchings (Roth, 1985a). Both
under complete and incomplete information there is a multiplicity of OBNE and the
existence of OBNE is guaranteed.
4 The Main Result and Its Applications
The support of a common belief P˜ is the set of proﬁles on which P˜ puts a positive
weight; namely, proﬁle P belongs to the support of P˜ if and only if Pr{P˜ = P} > 0.
We will show that for stable mechanisms there is a strong and surprising link
between equilibria under incomplete information and equilibria under complete in-
formation. Note that this link holds for any stable mechanism and not only for the
deferred-acceptance algorithms.
Theorem 1 Let P˜ be a common belief, s be a strategy proﬁle, and ϕ be a stable mech-
anism. Then, s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under incomplete information
P˜ if and only if for any proﬁle P in the support of P˜ , s(P ) is a Nash equilibrium
under complete information P in the direct preference revelation game induced by ϕ.
Theorem 1 has several important consequences and applications. One immedi-
ate consequence is that for determining whether a strategy proﬁle is an OBNE, we
only need to check whether for each realization of the common belief the submitted
preference orderings constitute a Nash equilibrium under complete information. This
means that the uniquely relevant information for an OBNE is the support of the
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common belief. Therefore, no calculations of probabilities are necessary. This conse-
quence is very important for applications because we need to check equilibrium play
only for the realized (or observed) proﬁles. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, we can use
properties of NE (under complete information) to deduce characteristics of OBNE.
Below we turn to the applications of Theorem 1.
4.1 Application I: Structure of OBNE
By Theorem 1, a strategy proﬁle is an OBNE if and only if the agents play a Nash
equilibrium for any proﬁle in the support of the common belief. Therefore, (i) the set
of OBNE is identical for any two common beliefs with equal support and (ii) the set
of OBNE shrinks if the support of the common belief becomes larger.
Corollary 1 (Invariance) Let s be a strategy proﬁle and ϕ be a stable mechanism.
(a) Let P˜ and P˜ ′ be two common beliefs with equal support. Then, s is an OBNE
in the stable mechanism ϕ under P˜ if and only if s is an OBNE in the stable
mechanism ϕ under P˜ ′.
(b) Let P˜ and P˜ ′ be two common beliefs such that the support of P˜ ′ is contained in
the support of P˜ . If s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under P˜ , then s
is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under P˜ ′.
Now by (a) of Corollary 1, for stable mechanisms any OBNE is robust to per-
turbations of the common belief which leave its support unchanged. Therefore, any
OBNE remains an equilibrium if agents have diﬀerent beliefs with equal support, i.e.
each agent v may have a private belief P˜ v but all private beliefs have identical (or
common) support.17 This consequence is especially important for applications since
for many of them, the common belief assumption might be too strong.
17Then in Deﬁnition 4 of OBNE P˜ is replaced by P˜ v for each agent v. Theorem 1 and its proof
show that for any OBNE s, each agent’s strategy sv chooses a best response to the other reported
preferences for any proﬁle belonging to the support of his private belief. If all private beliefs have
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By (b) of Corollary 1, the set of OBNE with full support (i.e. all common beliefs
which put positive probability on all proﬁles) is contained in the set of OBNE of
any arbitrary common belief (or support). It turns out that OBNE with full support
provide a foundation of why any agent submits only rankings which according to
his true preference relation (i) contain only acceptable matches and (ii) report the
true ranking over the reported acceptable matches. For the ﬁrms (ii) requires an
inessential modiﬁcation: because we consider only stable mechanisms it is irrelevant
for a ﬁrm in which order it ranks its ﬁrst qf acceptable matches. For OBNE with
full support any ﬁrm submits only rankings which are essentially truthful: the ﬁrst
qf reported workers are the qf truthfully most preferred workers among all workers
reported acceptable and the reported ranking over the remaining workers reported
acceptable is truthful.
Formally, given v ∈ F and Pv, P ′v ∈ Pv, we call P ′v|A(P ′v) essentially Pv-truthful
if |A(P ′v)| ≤ qv or for the qv most preferred workers under P ′v, say w1, . . . , wqv , we
have for all w′ ∈ A(P ′v) and all w ∈ A(P ′v)\{w1, . . . , wqv}, P ′v|{w,w′} = Pv|{w,w′}.
For example, if qv = 2 and Pv : w1w2w3w4∅ . . ., then P ′v : w3w2w4∅ . . . and P ′′v :
w2w1w4∅ . . . are essentially Pv-truthful. Observe that condition (i) above will require
in addition that A(P ′v) ⊆ A(Pv) and A(P ′′v ) ⊆ A(Pv).
Corollary 2 (Essential Truthfulness for Full Support) Let P˜ be a common be-
lief with full support, s be a strategy proﬁle, and ϕ be a stable mechanism. Then, s is
an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under P˜ only if for all v ∈ V and all Pv ∈ Pv,
(i) A(sv(Pv)) ⊆ A(Pv) and (ii) sv(Pv)|A(sv(Pv)) = Pv|A(sv(Pv)) (if v ∈ W ) and
sv(Pv)|A(sv(Pv)) is essentially Pv-truthful (if v ∈ F ).
Proof. Let s be an OBNE in the mechanism ϕ under P˜ . Let v ∈ V and Pv ∈ Pv.
Assume v ∈ F (if v ∈ W the proof follows a similar argument).
equal support, then it follows that a strategy proﬁle s is an OBNE with private beliefs (with common
support) if and only if for any proﬁle P in the common support, s(P ) is a Nash equilibrium under
complete information P in the direct preference revelation game induced by ϕ.
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First we show that A(sv(Pv)) ⊆ A(Pv). Suppose that A(sv(Pv))\A(Pv) = ∅.
Let w ∈ A(sv(Pv))\A(Pv) and P−v ∈ P−v be such that A(Pw) = {v} and for all
v′ ∈ V \{v, w}, A(Pv′) = ∅. Let P = (Pv, P−v). Because P˜ has full support, we
have Pr{P˜ = P} > 0. Thus, by Theorem 1, s(P ) must be a NE in ϕ for P . But
then for all v′ ∈ V \{v, w}, A(Pv′) = ∅ implies ϕ[s(P )](v′) = ∅. This and w /∈ A(Pv)
implies ϕ[s(P )](v) = ∅ and ϕ[s(P )](w) = ∅. Hence, by stability of ϕ, we have
v /∈ A(sv′(Pv′)) for all v′ ∈ A(sv(Pv)). But now w proﬁtably deviates by reporting
P ′w ∈ Pw such that A(P ′w) = {v} because by w ∈ A(sv(Pv)), ϕ[P ′w, s−w(P−w)](w) = v
and vPw∅ = ϕ[s(P )](w). This means that s(P ) is not a NE in ϕ for P , a contradiction.
Second we show that sv(Pv)|A(sv(Pv)) is essentially Pv-truthful. If |A(sv(Pv))| ≤
qv, then nothing has to be shown. Let |A(sv(Pv))| > qv and w1, . . . , wqv be the qv most
preferred workers under sv(Pv). Let W
′ = {w1, . . . , wqv}. By A(sv(Pv)) ⊆ A(Pv), if
(ii) does not hold, then for some w′ ∈ A(sv(Pv)) and some w ∈ A(sv(Pv))\W ′,
w′sv(Pv)wsv(Pv)∅ and wPvw′Pv∅.18 Without loss of generality, let w′ ∈ W ′ (if
w′ /∈ W ′, then the proof is analogous). Let P−v ∈ P−v be such that (a) A(Pw) =
{v}, (b) A(Pw′) = {v}, (c) for all w′′ ∈ W ′, A(Pw′′) = {v}, and (d) for all v′ ∈
V \({v, w, w′} ∪ W ′), A(Pv′) = ∅. Let P = (Pv, P−v). Because P˜ has full support,
we have Pr{P˜ = P} > 0. Thus, by Theorem 1, s(P ) must be a NE in ϕ for P .
But then for all v′ ∈ V \({v, w, w′} ∪ W ′), A(Pv′) = ∅ implies ϕ[s(P )](v′) = ∅.
Furthermore, because P˜ has full support and s is an OBNE in ϕ under P˜ , it is
easy to verify that v ∈ A(sw′′(Pw′′)) for w′′ ∈ W ′ ∪ {w}. Then by stability of ϕ,
w′sv(Pv)wsv(Pv)∅, W ′ ⊆ A(Pv), A(Pw′) = {v}, and the fact that s(P ) is a NE in ϕ
for P , we must have ϕ[s(P )](v) = W ′. Since v ∈ A(sw(Pw)), now v proﬁtably deviates
by reporting P ′v ∈ Pv such that A(P ′v) = (W ′\{w′})∪{w} because by v ∈ A(sw(Pw)),
ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P−v)](v) = (W
′\{w′}) ∪ {w} and both wPvw′ and responsiveness imply
(W ′\{w′}) ∪ {w}P ∗v W ′ = ϕ[s(P )](v) for all P ∗v ∈ resp(Pv). This means that s(P ) is
not a NE in ϕ for P , a contradiction. 
18Observe that if v ∈ W the contradiction hypothesis would be that for some f, f ′ ∈ A(sv(Pv)),
f ′sv(Pv)fsv(Pv)∅ and fPvf ′Pv∅.
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Note that any OBNE for a common belief with full support is an OBNE for any
arbitrary belief. Hence, such OBNE are invariant with respect to the common belief
and remain OBNE if the agents’ beliefs are not necessarily derived from the same
common belief. Of course, by Corollary 2, those OBNE are robust to changes of
the common belief(s) only if each agent’s strategy ranks acceptable only matches
which are acceptable according to the true ranking and the reported ranking over the
acceptable matches is essentially truthful.
4.2 Application II: Realized Matchings
The previous application described properties of strategy proﬁles which constitute
an OBNE in a stable mechanism. For real-life environments we are also interested
in which outcomes will be observed. Or in other words, for a given OBNE which
matchings are realized ex-post, i.e. after each realization of a proﬁle and its submitted
rankings. Since we consider stable mechanisms, any realized matching is stable for
the submitted proﬁle. It turns out that all agents unanimously agree that the realized
matching is truthfully most preferred among all matchings which are stable for the
submitted proﬁle.
Corollary 3 (Ex-Post Unanimity) Let P˜ be a common belief, s be a strategy pro-
ﬁle, and ϕ be a stable mechanism. Then, s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism
ϕ under P˜ only if for all proﬁles P belonging to the support of P˜ , all μ ∈ C(s(P ))
and all v ∈ V , ϕ[s(P )](v)Rvμ(v) (if v ∈ W ) and ϕ[s(P )](v)R∗vμ(v) for all responsive
extensions P ∗v of Pv (if v ∈ F ).
Proof. Let P ∈ P be such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0. Without loss of generality, let v ∈ F
(the proof for v ∈ W is analogous and easier). Suppose that for some μ ∈ C(s(P )) we
have μ(v)P ∗v ϕ[s(P )](v) for some P
∗
v ∈ resp(Pv). Since the number of ﬁlled positions is
identical for all ﬁrms for any two stable matchings (property (P3) of the core and sta-
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ble matchings), we have |μ(v)| = |ϕ[s(P )](v)|. Then μ(v)\ϕ[s(P )](v) = ∅ and by The-
orem 4 of Roth and Sotomayor (1989), for all w ∈ μ(v) and all w′ ∈ ϕ[s(P )](v)\μ(v),
wPvw
′. Let P ′v ∈ Pv be such that A(P ′v) = μ(v). Then it is easy to check that
μ ∈ C(s(P )) implies μ ∈ C(P ′v, s−v(P−v)). By stability of ϕ and A(P ′v) = μ(v),
ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P−v)](v) = μ(v). Since μ(v)P
∗
v ϕ[s(P )](v), s(P ) is not a NE in ϕ for P and
by Theorem 1, s is not an OBNE in ϕ under P˜ , a contradiction. 
Ehlers and Masso´ (2004, Theorem 2) showed Corollary 3 for one-to-one matching
markets. Note that they could not rely on our general result Theorem 1 which allows
the use of simple arguments to show that whenever the agents do not unanimously
agree that the realized matching is most preferred in the core of the reported proﬁle,
then the agents do not play a NE at this proﬁle.
In the above corollary the core of the submitted proﬁle and the realized matching
were related in terms of the true proﬁle. Below we give for one-to-one matching
markets a necessary and suﬃcient condition for all realized matchings to belong to
the core of the true proﬁle. Then all realized matchings are ex-post stable, i.e. for any
proﬁle in the support of the common belief, the matching chosen for the submitted
rankings is stable for the true proﬁle.
A proﬁle P ′ ∈ P is a strong Nash equilibrium (SNE) under complete informa-
tion P in the direct preference revelation game induced by the mechanism ϕ if for
all coalitions S ⊆ V there exists no P ′′S ∈ PS such that (i) for all w ∈ S ∩ W ,
ϕ[P ′′S , P
′
−S](w)Pwϕ[P
′](w), and (ii) for all f ∈ S ∩ F , ϕ[P ′′S , P ′−S](f)P ∗f ϕ[P ′](f) for
some P ∗f ∈ resp(Pf ).
Corollary 4 (Ex-Post Stability for Marriage Markets) Let qf = 1 for all f ∈
F , P˜ be a common belief, s be a strategy proﬁle, and ϕ be a stable mechanism. Let s
be an OBNE in ϕ under P˜ . Then, s is ex-post stable (for all P in the support of P˜ ,
ϕ[s(P )] ∈ C(P )) if and only if for all P in the support of P˜ , s(P ) is a SNE under
complete information P .
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Proof. Follows directly from Theorem 1 and the fact that for any proﬁle P and any
NE s(P ) in ϕ under complete information P , ϕ[s(P )] ∈ C(P ) if and only if s(P ) is a
SNE in ϕ under complete information P (Shin and Suh, 1996; So¨nmez, 1997). 
For college admissions problems, under complete information it is known that the
outcome of a SNE might not be stable under the true proﬁle (Ma, 2002, Example 1).
Therefore, in general the requirement that for any proﬁle in the support the agents
play a SNE is not suﬃcient for an OBNE to be ex-post stable. However, since the
set of stable matchings coincides with the core, in college admissions problems this
condition remains necessary for OBNE to be ex-post stable.
4.3 Application III: Truth-Telling
When agents’ preferences are private information, we would like to design a mecha-
nism which elicits the true preferences from the agents. In order to guarantee that
agents truthfully report their preferences, incentive-compatible mechanisms make it a
(weakly) dominant strategy to report truthfully. Incentive-compatibility is equivalent
to the requirement that for any proﬁle truth-telling is a NE under complete informa-
tion. Therefore, incentive-compatibility is equivalent to truth-telling being an OBNE
for all common beliefs.
Since incentive-compatibility is a strong condition, our incomplete information
environment allows a weaker (but still natural) condition. Given a common belief
and a mechanism, Bayesian incentive-compatibility requires that all agents truthfully
reveal their preferences at any proﬁle belonging to the support of the common be-
lief. By our powerful result Theorem 1, in many-to-one matching markets for stable
mechanisms Bayesian incentive-compatibility is equivalent to the requirement that
truth-telling is a NE under complete information for any proﬁle belonging to the sup-
port of the common belief. Now it follows directly from Corollary 3 that truth-telling
is an OBNE only if the core is singleton at any realized proﬁle.
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Corollary 5 Let P˜ be a common belief. Then, truth-telling is an OBNE in a stable
mechanism under incomplete information P˜ only if the support of P˜ is contained in
the set of all proﬁles with a singleton core.
Since in college admissions problems incentive compatibility is equivalent to Bayesian
incentive-compatibility for a common belief with full support, Roth’s (1982) result
(there exists no mechanism which is both stable and incentive-compatible) follows
from Corollary 5 because there exist proﬁles with non-singleton core.
By Theorem 1, singleton cores would be suﬃcient for truth-telling to be an OBNE
if at any proﬁle belonging to the support of the common belief, truth-telling is a NE
under complete information. By Roth (1985a) we know that this is not the case since
he provides an example with singleton core where truth-telling is not a NE under
complete information. Speciﬁcally, in his example a ﬁrm with more than one position
proﬁtably manipulates.
If each ﬁrm has exactly one position, then Ehlers and Masso´ (2004) show that
singleton core is suﬃcient for truth-telling to be a NE in any stable mechanism under
complete information. Therefore, we obtain the principal result of Ehlers and Masso´
(2004) as a corollary from Theorem 1.
Corollary 6 [Theorem 1 in Ehlers and Masso´ (2004)] Let qf = 1 for all f ∈ F and
P˜ be a common belief. Then, truth-telling is an OBNE in a stable mechanism under
incomplete information P˜ if and only if the support of P˜ is contained in the set of all
proﬁles with singleton core.
5 Final Remarks
In many-to-one matching markets Theorem 1 provides for stable mechanisms a strong
link between OBNE under incomplete information and NE under complete informa-
tion. The following peculiarities of college admissions problems are important for the
main result: (p1) any ﬁrm ﬁlls the same number of positions under any two stable
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matchings; and (p2) starting from any college admissions problem and its workers-
optimal matching, when new workers become available all ﬁrms weakly prefer any
matching, which is stable for the enlarged problem, to the workers-optimal matching
of the original problem.19
It is clear that the link in Theorem 1 is in general not true for BNE. For instance, in
the two-player game of matching pennies we may interpret each agent’s pure strategies
(heads and tails) as his possible types. Now if the common belief comes from two
independent marginal beliefs that put probability 1
2
on each type, and hence, the
common belief puts probability 1
4
on each strategy proﬁle (as in the unique NE in
mixed strategies), then truth-telling is a BNE under this common belief whereas the
game does not have any NE (in pure strategies) under complete information.
It would be interesting to identify other economic environments where a similar
link between BNE under incomplete information and NE under complete information
holds. In those environments the strategic analysis under complete information is
essential to undertake the corresponding analysis under incomplete information. For
determining whether a strategy proﬁle is an equilibrium under incomplete informa-
tion, we only need to check whether for each realization the submitted preference
orderings are a Nash equilibrium under complete information. Furthermore, if this
link holds, then any BNE is robust to perturbations of the common belief which do
not change the support of the common belief and agents may have private beliefs
with equal support.
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APPENDIX
Before we prove Theorem 1, we recall the following properties of the core of a
college admissions problem. These properties will be used frequently in the proof. It
will be convenient to write (F,W, P ; q) for any college admissions problem (F,W, q, P )
in which qf = 1 for all f ∈ F .
A.1 Properties of the Core
(I) For each P ∈ P , the set of unmatched agents is the same for all stable matchings
(see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Theorems 5.12 and 5.13); namely, for all μ, μ′ ∈ C(P ),
and for all w ∈ W and f ∈ F , (i) if μ(w) = ∅, then μ′(w) = ∅; (ii) |μ(f)| = |μ′(f)|;
and (iii) if |μ(f)| < qf , then μ(f) = μ′(f).
(II) Given (F,W, q, P ), split each ﬁrm f into qf identical copies of itself (all having
the same preference ordering Pf ) and let F
′ be this new set of
∑
f∈F qf splitted ﬁrms.
Set q′f ′ = 1 for all f
′ ∈ F ′ and replace f by its copies in F ′ (always in the same order)
in each worker’s preference relation Pw. Then, (F
′,W, P ; q′) is a marriage market for
which we can uniquely identify its matchings with the matchings of the original college
admissions problem (F,W, q, P ), and vice versa (Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, Lemma
5.6). Then, and using this identiﬁcation, we write C(F,W, q, P ) = C(F ′,W, P ; q′).
(III) Consider a marriage market (F,W, P ; q) and suppose that new workers enter the
market. Let (F,W ′, P ′; q) be this new marriage market where W ⊆ W ′ and P ′ agrees
with P over F and W . Let DAW [P ] = μW . Then, for all f ∈ F , μ′(f)R′fμW (f) for
all μ′ ∈ C(F,W ′, P ′; q) (Gale and Sotomayor, 1985; Crawford, 1991).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 Let P˜ be a common belief, s be a strategy proﬁle, and ϕ be a stable mech-
anism. Then, s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under incomplete information
P˜ if and only if for any proﬁle P in the support of P˜ , s(P ) is a Nash equilibrium
under complete information P in the direct preference revelation game induced by ϕ.
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Proof. Let P˜ be a common belief, s be a strategy proﬁle and ϕ be a stable mecha-
nism.
(⇐) Suppose that for any proﬁle P in the support of P˜ , s(P ) is a Nash equilib-
rium under complete information P in the direct preference revelation game in-
duced by ϕ. Let v ∈ V and Pv ∈ Pv be such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0. By
the previous fact, then we have for all P ′v ∈ Pv and all P−v ∈ P−v such that
Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P−v} > 0, ϕ[s(P )](v)R∗vϕ[P ′v, s−v(P−v)](v) for all P ∗v ∈ resp(Pv) (if
v ∈ F ) and ϕ[s(P )](v)Rvϕ[P ′v, s−v(P−v)](v) (if v ∈ W ). Hence,
ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)Pv ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v),
and s is an OBNE in ϕ under P˜ , the desired conclusion.
(⇒) Let s be an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under incomplete information P˜ .
First we show that for all P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0,
ϕ[s(P )](v) ⊆ A(Pv) for all v ∈ V. (2)
If for some P in the support of P˜ and for some v ∈ V , ϕ[s(P )](v) ⊆ A(Pv), then
choose P ′v ∈ Pv such that A(P ′v) = A(Pv) ∩ A(sv(Pv)) and P ′v|A(P ′v) = sv(Pv)|A(P ′v).
By the stability of ϕ and our choice of P ′v, we have ϕ[P
′
v, s−v(P
′
−v)](v) ⊆ A(Pv) for
all P ′−v ∈ P−v. Let v ∈ F (the case v ∈ W is analogous and easier). We choose
a responsive extension P ∗v of Pv such that for all W
′ ∈ 2W , W ′R∗v∅ if and only
if W ′ ⊆ A(Pv). Hence, by ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P−v)](v) ⊆ A(Pv) and ϕ[s(P )](v) ⊆ A(Pv),
ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P−v)](v)R
∗
v∅P ∗v ϕ[s(P )](v). Since Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P−v} > 0, it follows that
Pr{ϕ[P ′v, s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) ∈ B(∅, P ∗v )} = 1 > Pr{ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) ∈ B(∅, P ∗v )},
which means that s is not an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ under P˜ , a contra-
diction. Hence, (2) holds.
Second suppose that there is some P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0 and s(P )
is not a Nash equilibrium under complete information P in the direct preference
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revelation game induced by ϕ. Then (w.l.o.g.) there exist f ∈ F , P ′f ∈ Pf , and a
responsive extension P ∗f of Pf such that
ϕ[P ′f , s−f (P−f )](f)P
∗
f ϕ[s(P )](f). (3)
The case where a worker has a proﬁtable deviation is analogous to the case where a
ﬁrm with quota one has a proﬁtable deviation.
Let ϕ[P ′f , s−f (P−f )] = μ
′ and ϕ[s(P )] = μ. Furthermore, let μ′(f) = {w′1, w′2, . . . , w′|μ′(f)|}
where w′1Pfw
′
2Pf · · ·Pfw′|μ′(f)| and μ(f) = {w1, w2, . . . , w|μ(f)|} where w1Pfw2Pf · · ·Pfw|μ(f)|.
Case 1: There exists k ∈ {1, . . . , |μ′(f)|} such that w′kPfwk and wlRfw′l for all
l ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}.
Note that w′k ∈ A(Pf ) because w′kPfwk and by (2), wk ∈ μ(f) ⊆ A(Pf ). Let
P ′′f ∈ Pf be such that A(P ′′f ) = B(w′k, Pf ) and P ′′f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ).
First we show that ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P−f )](f) contains at least k workers. Note that any
proﬁle implicitly speciﬁes the set of agents of the matching problem. For the time
being, below we specify both the proﬁle and the quota of the matching problem.
Because ϕ is stable and ϕ[P ′f , s−f (P−f )] = μ
′, we have μ′ ∈ C(P ′f , s−f (P−f ); q). Let
μ′′ be the matching for the problem (F,W\{w′k+1, . . . , w′|μ′(f)|}, (k, q−f ),
(P ′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}))) such that μ
′′(f) = {w′1, . . . , w′k} and
μ′′(f ′) = μ(f ′) for all f ′ ∈ F\{f}. Then from μ′ ∈ C(P ′f , s−f (P−f ); q) it follows that
μ′′ ∈ C(P ′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); k, q−f ). (4)
By our choice of P ′′f , we have μ
′′(f) ⊆ A(P ′′f ) and P ′′f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ). Hence, we
also have by (4),
μ′′ ∈ C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); k, q−f ). (5)
Thus, by μ′′(f) = {w′1, . . . , w′k} and the fact that any ﬁrm is matched to the same
number of workers under all stable matchings, ﬁrm f is matched to k workers for
all matchings belonging to C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); k, q−f ).
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Now if ﬁrm f is matched to fewer than k workers in some matching belonging to
C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); q), then this matching is also stable
for the problem (P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); k, q−f ), a contradic-
tion to the previous fact. Hence, f is matched to at least k workers in any sta-
ble matching belonging to C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); q). Now
when considering the worker optimal matching in this core, we may split ﬁrm f
into qf copies (all having the same preference P
′′
f ) and each copy of ﬁrm f weakly
prefers according to P ′′f any matching in C(P
′′
f , P−f ; q) to this matching. Since at
least k copies of f are matched to a worker under the worker optimal matching in
C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+1,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); q), at least k copies of f must be
also matched to a worker under any stable matching in C(P ′′f , s−f (P−f ); q). There-
fore, by ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P−f )] ∈ C(P ′′f , s−f (P−f ); q), ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P−f )](f) contains at least k
workers.
Second we choose a responsive extension P ∗∗f of Pf . Let W
∗ ⊆ B(w′k, Pf ) be
such that W ∗ consists of the k lowest ranked workers (according to Pf ) in the set
B(w′k, Pf ), i.e. |W ∗| = k and for all w ∈ B(w′k, Pf )\W ∗ and all w∗ ∈ W ∗, wPfw∗.
Let P ∗∗f be the responsive extension of Pf be such that for all W
′′ ∈ 2W , W ′′P ∗∗f W ∗
if and only if the following three conditions hold: (i) W ′′ ⊆ A(Pf ), (ii) |W ′′| ≥ k,
and (iii) if W ′′ = {w′′1 , w′′2 , . . . , w′′|W ′′|} where w′′1Pf · · ·Pfw′′|W ′′| and W ∗ = {w∗1, . . . , w∗k}
where w∗1Pf · · ·Pfw∗k, then w′′l Rfw∗l for all l ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Since ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P−f )](f)
contains at least k workers and A(P ′′f ) = B(w
′
k, Pf ), our construction implies that
ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P−f )](f)P
∗∗
f ϕ[s(P )](f). More precisely, for Case 1 the set ϕ[s(P )](f) vio-
lates (iii) and our choice of P ∗∗f and W
∗ yields
ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P−f )](f)R
∗∗
f W
∗P ∗∗f ϕ[s(P )](f). (6)
Third we show that for all (Pf , P
′
−f ) in the support of P˜ , if ϕ[sf (Pf ), s−f (P
′
−f )](f) ∈
B(W ∗, P ∗∗f ), then ϕ[P
′′
f , s−f (P
′
−f )](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗∗f ). This then completes the proof
for Case 1 because by Pr{P˜−f |Pf = P−f} > 0, and (6), it follows that
Pr{ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P˜−f |Pf )](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗∗f )} > Pr{ϕ[sf (Pf ), s−f (P˜−f |Pf )](f) ∈ B(W ∗, P ∗∗f )},
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which means that s is not an OBNE in ϕ under P˜ .
Suppose that ϕ[sf (Pf ), s−f (P ′−f )](f)R
∗∗
f W
∗. By our choice of P ∗∗f , then
ϕ[sf (Pf ), s−f (P ′−f )](f) ∩B(w′k, Pf ) must contain at least k workers. (7)
If ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P
′
−f )](f) contains at least k workers, then all these workers belong to
B(w′k, Pf ). Thus, by our choice of P
∗∗
f and W
∗, ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P
′
−f )](f)R
∗∗
f W
∗, the desired
conclusion.
Suppose that ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P
′
−f )](f) contains fewer than k workers. Let μˆ =
ϕ[sf (Pf ), s−f (P ′−f )]. Let μˆ(f) = {wˆ1, . . . , wˆ|μˆ(f)|} where wˆ1Pf · · ·Pf wˆ|μˆ(f)|. By (7),
μˆ(f) ∩ B(w′k, Pf ) contains at least k workers. Thus, k ≤ |μˆ(f)|. For the time
being, below we specify both the proﬁle and the quota of the matching problem.
Then we have μˆ ∈ C(sf (Pf ), s−f (P ′−f ); q). Let μˆ′ be the matching for the problem
(F,W\{wˆk+1, . . . , wˆ|μˆ(f)|}, (k, q−f ), (sf (Pf ), s−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}(P ′−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|})) such
that μˆ′(f) = {wˆ1, . . . , wˆk} and μˆ′(f ′) = μˆ(f ′) for all f ′ ∈ F\{f}. Then, from
μˆ ∈ C(sf (Pf ), s−f (P ′−f ); q) it follows that
μˆ′ ∈ C(sf (Pf ), s−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}(P ′−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}); k, q−f ). (8)
Let wˆ ∈ μˆ′(f) be such that μˆ′(f) ⊆ B(wˆ, sf (Pf )) (in other words, wˆ is the worker
who is least preferred in μˆ′(f) according to sf (Pf )). Let Pˆf ∈ Pf be such that
A(Pˆf ) = B(wˆk, Pf ) ∩ B(wˆ, sf (Pf )) and Pˆf |A(Pˆf ) = P ′′f |A(Pˆf ). Then we must have
μˆ′ ∈ C(Pˆf , s−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}(P ′−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}); k, q−f ) (otherwise there would
exist a blocking pair for μˆ′;20 then by (8) and the fact that only ﬁrm f ’s preference
changed from sf (Pf ) to Pˆf , ﬁrm f needs to be part of this blocking pair; thus, (w, f)
blocks μˆ′ which implies w /∈ μˆ′(f) and w = wˆ, and w ∈ A(Pˆf ) = B(wˆk, Pf ) ∩
B(wˆ, sf (Pf )); therefore, w ∈ B(wˆ, sf (Pf ))\μˆ′(f) and (w, f) must also block μˆ′ under
(sf (Pf ), s−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}(P
′
−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}); k, q−f ), a contradiction to (8).)
Thus, since |μˆ′(f)| = k, ﬁrm f is matched to k workers for all matchings belonging
to C(Pˆf , s−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}(P
′
−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}); k, q−f ). Now if ﬁrm f is matched
20Note that μˆ′ is individually rational because both μˆ′(f) ⊆ B(wˆk, Pf ) and μˆ′(f) ⊆ B(wˆ, sf (Pf ))
(by our choice of wˆ).
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to fewer than k workers for some μ˜ ∈ C(Pˆf , s−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}(P ′−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}); q),
then μ˜ is also stable under (Pˆf , s−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}(P
′
−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}); k, q−f ), a
contradiction to the previous fact. Hence, f is matched to at least k workers in
any stable matching belonging to C(Pˆf , s−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}(P
′
−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}); q).
Now when considering the worker optimal matching in this core, we may split ﬁrm
f into qf copies (all having the same preference Pˆf ) and each copy of ﬁrm f weakly
prefers according to Pˆf any matching in C(Pˆf , s−f (P ′−f ); q) to this matching. Since
at least k copies of f are matched to a worker under the worker optimal matching in
C(Pˆf , s−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}(P
′
−{f}∪{wˆk+1,...,wˆ|μˆ(f)|}); q),
at least k copies of f are matched to a worker in any matching in C(Pˆf , s−f (P ′−f ); q).
(9)
On the other hand, ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P
′
−f )](f) contains fewer than k workers. Let μ˜ =
ϕ[P ′′f , s−f (P
′
−f )]. Let μ˜
′ be the matching for the problem (F,W\(μ˜(f)\A(Pˆf )), q,
(P ′′f , s−{f}∪(μ˜(f)\A(Pˆf ))(P
′
−{f}∪(μ˜(f)\A(Pˆf ))))) such that μ˜
′(f) = μ˜(f)∩A(Pˆf ) and μ˜′(f ′) =
μ˜(f ′) for all f ′ ∈ F\{f}. Since μ˜ ∈ C(P ′′f , s−f (P ′−f ), q) and μ˜(f) contains fewer than
qf workers, we must have μ˜
′ ∈ C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪(μ˜(f)\A(Pˆf ))(P ′−{f}∪(μ˜(f)\A(Pˆf ))); q). Thus, by
μ˜′(f) ⊆ A(Pˆf ) and Pˆf |A(Pˆf ) = P ′′f |A(Pˆf ), we also obtain
μ˜′ ∈ C(Pˆf , s−{f}∪(μ˜(f)\A(Pˆf ))(P ′−{f}∪(μ˜(f)\A(Pˆf ))); q). Hence, in any matching belonging
to this core ﬁrm f is matched to |μ˜′(f)| = |μ˜(f)∩A(Pˆf )| workers. Now when consider-
ing the worker optimal matching in this core, we may split each ﬁrm f ′ ∈ F\{f} into
qf ′ copies (all having the same preference sf ′(P
′
f ′)) and each copy of ﬁrm f
′ weakly
prefers according to sf ′(P
′
f ′) any matching in C(Pˆf , s−f (P
′
−f ); q) to this matching.
Thus, in total all the copies of all ﬁrms f ′ ∈ F\{f} receive at least the same number
of workers in C(Pˆf , s−f (P ′−f ); q) as they did previously. Since exactly |μ˜(f)\A(Pˆf )|
new workers are available and f was matched to |μ˜′(f)| = |μ˜(f) ∩ A(Pˆf )| workers
before, ﬁrm f can be matched to at most |μ˜(f)| workers under any stable matching
in C(Pˆf , s−f (P ′−f ); q). Since |μ˜(f)| is smaller than k, this contradicts (9) and the fact
that under responsive preferences, ﬁrm f is matched to the same number of work-
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ers for any two matchings in C(Pˆf , s−f (P ′−f ); q). Hence, ϕ[P
′′
f , s−f (P
′
−f )](f) cannot
contain fewer than k workers.
Case 2: Otherwise.
Then we have wlRfw
′
l for all l ∈ {1, . . . ,min{|μ(f)|, |μ′(f)|}}. Let k = |μ(f)|. If
|μ′(f)| ≤ μ(f), then by responsiveness of P ∗f and μ(f) ⊆ A(Pf ), we have μ(f)R∗fμ′(f),
which contradicts (3). Hence, we must have |μ′(f)| > |μ(f)| = k, qf > k, and w′k+1 ∈
A(Pf ). Let P
′′
f ∈ Pf be such that A(P ′′f ) = B(w′k+1, Pf ) and P ′′f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ).
Since μ(f) ⊆ B(w′k+1, Pf ) = A(P ′′f ) and μ(f) does not ﬁll the quota of ﬁrm f , we
must have μ ∈ C(P ′′f , s−f (P−f ); q). Hence,
ﬁrm f is matched to k workers under any matching in C(P ′′f , s−f (P−f ); q). (10)
On the other hand, let μ′′ be the matching for the problem (F,W\{w′k+2, . . . , w′|μ′(f)|}, (k+
1, q−f ), (P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}))) such that μ
′′(f) = {w′1, . . . , w′k+1}
and μ′′(f ′) = μ′(f ′) for all f ′ ∈ F\{f}. Then from μ′ ∈ C(P ′f , s−f (P−f ); q) it fol-
lows that μ′′ ∈ C(P ′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); k +1, q−f ). Thus, by
μ′′(f) ⊆ B(w′k+1, Pf ) = A(P ′′f ) and P ′′f |A(P ′′f ) = P ′f |A(P ′′f ),
μ′′ ∈ C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); k + 1, q−f ). Now if ﬁrm f is
matched to fewer than k + 1 workers in some matching belonging to
C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); q), then this matching is also stable
for the problem (P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); k + 1, q−f ), a contra-
diction to the previous fact. Hence, f is matched to at least k+1 workers in any sta-
ble matching belonging to C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); q). Now
when considering the worker optimal matching in this core, we may split ﬁrm f into
k + 1 copies (all having the same preference P ′′f ) and each copy of ﬁrm f weakly
prefers according to P ′′f any matching in C(P
′′
f , s−f (P−f ); q) to this matching. Since
at least k + 1 copies of f are matched to a worker under the worker optimal match-
ing in C(P ′′f , s−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}(P−{f}∪{w′k+2,...,w′|μ′(f)|}); q), at least k + 1 copies of f
must be also matched to a worker under any matching in C(P ′′f , s−f (P−f ); q), which
contradicts (10) and the fact that ﬁrm f is matched to the same number of workers
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under any matching in C(P ′′f , s−f (P−f ); q). Hence, Case 2 cannot occur. 
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